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NOTE: LIMITING THE DEADLY IMPACT OF 
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
(PTSD): 
 
OFFENDERS SUFFERING FROM PTSD AT THE TIME 
OF THE OFFENSE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE 
DEATH PENALTY. 
 




The Constitution of the United States prohibits the 
infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”1 However, a 
consistently asked question is what constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment. In 1958, the Supreme Court stated that 
“the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man,”2 and recognized that the 
“words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that 
[the Court's] scope is not static.”3 Thus, “[t]he Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”4 Accordingly, the 
constitutionality of the death penalty—specifically the 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.   
2 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).  
3 Id. at 100-01.  
4 Id. at 101. 
156                     7 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2020) 
 
  
implementation of it—depends on what society deems 
appropriate at a given time.  
To date, the death penalty does not per se constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. However, as society’s standard of decency has 
narrowed, certain impositions of the death penalty have been 
found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, 
a death sentence is only warranted for offenders who have 
committed first-degree murder.5 Additionally, the death 
penalty cannot be imposed on intellectually disabled 
individuals or juveniles because these specific classes of 
offenders essentially have a reduced criminal culpability, 
rendering the punishment of death disproportionate. 6   
Recently, there has been a growing controversy in the 
United States as to whether executing an offender suffering 
from a severe mental defect constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a severe 
mental defect that has historically carried little weight as a 
defense in the criminal justice system. However, as the 
American people develop a better understanding of PTSD and 
the effect it can have on an offender's criminal culpability, its 
role in a criminal defense should be weighed more heavily. For 
PTSD to play a valid role in the criminal justice system it must 
be accurately understood, diagnosed, and deemed admissible. 
Furthermore, an admissible PTSD diagnosis must be 
appropriately placed in a defense.    
Initially, PTSD must be diagnosed by a qualified mental 
health physician, and that physician must testify as an expert 
witness at trial for the offender’s PTSD diagnosis to be 
admissible. While the admissibility of an offender’s PTSD is 
essential, appropriately placing a PTSD diagnosis in the 
offender’s defense is equally important. There are three 
potential places for PTSD to fit within a defense. First, PTSD 
 
5 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).  
6 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Court holding it 
unconstitutional to execute intellectually disabled individuals, and 
creating an exclusionary category exempting those offenders from 
the death penalty); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Court 
finding that executing any offender under the age of eighteen 
unconstitutional, and creating an exclusionary category exempting 
that specific class of offenders from the death penalty). 




seemingly would fit within the insanity defense. However, 
PTSD would fall in-between the cracks of the inconsistent tests 
applied in various jurisdictions throughout the United States. 
Second, it seems appropriate to consider PTSD as a mitigating 
circumstance to be weighed against the case’s aggravating 
circumstances at the sentencing phase of trial. However, an 
offender’s mental illness does not generally carry much weight 
as a mitigating circumstance in a capital case, and PTSD is such 
a severe mental defect that it should carry a significant amount 
of weight. Thus, according to today’s standards of human 
decency, an exclusionary category should be created to exempt 
offenders who were suffering from PTSD at the time of the 
offense from the death penalty.  
 
II. UNDERSTANDING PTSD 
 
Until recently there has been little information 
regarding PTSD and the effect it commonly has on those who 
have it. Now that this information has become readily available, 
what PTSD is and who can have it is better understood. Thus, 
it has become apparent that PTSD reduces an offender’s 
criminal culpability.  
 
A. ANYONE CAN HAVE PTSD 
 
PTSD is an anxiety disorder that occurs “exclusively in 
persons who have experienced an emotional or physical trauma 
of the highest magnitude.”7 When one hears the term PTSD, 
they automatically think about combat veterans. While combat 
veterans are historically considered the majority of those who 
fall victim to PTSD, this disorder is not limited to veterans 
alone.   
Rather, overwhelming stressors that may lead to PTSD include 
“war, rape, assault, accidents, fires, and natural disasters.”8  
 
7  Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) as a Defense to Murder, Assault, or other Violent Crime, 4 A.L.R. 
7th 5 (2020).  
8 Id.  
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The earliest information on PTSD came from studies of 
male combat veterans, specifically Vietnam Veterans.9 
Eventually, researchers began to see a parallel between the 
trauma of male combat veterans and the trauma of women who 
suffered from sexual assault, and ultimately found that a 
women’s sexual trauma experience also can lead to PTSD 
similar to that of a combat veteran.10 Retired army colonel, Dr. 
Elspeth Cameron Ritchie, stated that “[i]n some ways, the 
trauma from sexual assault may be worse than the trauma from 
combat because normally, soldiers are prepared and trained for 
combat.”11 Similarly, researchers found that children and teens 
can develop PTSD if they have lived through a trauma that 
could have caused them or someone else to be killed or severely 
injured.12 Thus, under the right traumatic circumstances, 
anyone—regardless of age, gender, or profession—can have 
PTSD.  
 
B. PTSD TRIGGERS  
 
When an individual suffers from PTSD, certain triggers 
can cause that individual to act irrationally as if he or she were 
re-living the traumatic event that initially caused his or her 
PTSD, resulting in the victim reacting to that trigger without 
realizing exactly what he or she is doing. Specifically, “being 
‘triggered’ more narrowly refers to the experience of people 
with [PTSD] re-experiencing symptoms of a traumatic event 
(such as exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, 
 
9 PTSD: National Center for PTSD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, 
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_women.
asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).   
10 Id.  
11 Heather Mayer Irvine, The Most Common PTSD Triggers—and How 
to Manage Them, HEALTH (Apr. 3, 2020, 1:45 PM),  
https://www.health.com/condition/ptsd/ptsd-triggers. 
12 PTSD: National Center for PTSD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, 
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_children
_teens.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).  




or sexual violation) after being exposed to a trigger that is a 
catalyst or reminder.”13  
Commonly, sights, sounds, smells, and emotions that a 
PTSD victim associates with their trauma are considered PTSD 
triggers.14 Veterans suffering from PTSD are often triggered by 
the smell of burning meat, which resembles the smell of charred 
flesh during action, and diesel fuel that is used in military 
trucks.15 Such veterans are also commonly triggered by the 
sound of helicopters or loud bangs.16 Likewise, sexual assault 
victims suffering from PTSD are commonly triggered by 
sounds, smells, or any other circumstance that reminds the 
victim of the assault.17   
Even though it has yet to be determined exactly how 
these triggers are formed, it is known “that triggers can cause 
an emotional reaction before a person realizes why they have 
become upset.”18 Thus, any person with PTSD, when triggered, 
may make a bad choice or partake in a bad act without knowing 
the magnitude of what he or she is doing.  
 
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF PTSD 
 
When a person suffering from PTSD commits an offense, 
the PTSD is relevant to the offender’s criminal culpability. 
However, before the offender’s PTSD can be considered by the 
court, it must first be deemed admissible. Accordingly, for the 
offender’s PTSD to be deemed admissible, it must be 





13 Arlin Cuncic, What Does it Mean to Be ‘Triggered’, VERYWELLMIND 
(Apr. 3, 2020, 2:20 PM), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-
does-it-mean-to-be-triggered-4175432. 
14 Id. 
15 Heather Mayer Irvine, supra note 11. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Arlin Cuncic, supra note 13.  
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A. DIAGNOSING PTSD  
 
As the understanding of who can have PTSD has 
broadened, the theories and processes of how PTSD is 
diagnosed have evolved accordingly. Currently, PTSD must be 
diagnosed by a mental health care physician by determining 
that eight criteria are present.19 Specifically, the criteria look to 
the existence of a person’s stressor(s), the existence of intrusion 
symptoms, the person’s avoidance of trauma-related stimuli 
after the trauma, negative alterations in the person’s cognition 
and mood, trauma-related arousal and reactivity, the duration 
of the person’s symptoms, the person’s distress or functional 
impairment, and the absence of any other causes.20  
 
B. LEGAL STANDARD  
 
Even after a mental health care physician has made an 
official medical PTSD diagnosis, the diagnosis must satisfy the 
legal standard to be admissible at trial. For a diagnosis of PTSD 
to be considered valid according to the legal standard, the 
diagnosing physician must testify and qualify as a credible and 
reliable expert witness under the applicable evidentiary rules. 
For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: 
 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony 
is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles 
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
 
19 DSM-5 Criteria for PTSD, BRAINLINE, 
https://www.brainline.org/article/dsm-5-criteria-ptsd (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2020).  
20 Id.  




applied the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.21 
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has enumerated a list of 
nonexclusive factors that a trial court might consider in 
determining whether an expert’s reasoning and methodology is 
reliable: (1) whether the theory or technique has been or could 
be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject 
to peer review and publication; (3) what the rate of error of the 
technique or theory was when applied; (4) the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s 
operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique has been 
generally accepted in the scientific community.22  
Accordingly, so long as a PTSD diagnosis and the 
diagnosing physician meet these elements, the offender’s PTSD 
should be admissible. Once an offender’s PTSD has been 
deemed admissible, the next issue regarding this mental defect 
is its place in a case. Specifically, where and offender’s PTSD 
will most appropriately fit in a defensive argument when the 
offender is subject to the death penalty. 
 
IV. PTSD AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE  
 
There has been an ongoing debate about where PTSD 
fits within an offender’s defense in a capital case. One argument 
is that PTSD should be covered within the insanity defense. 
Throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
the insanity defense evolved significantly.23 At common law, 
the applicable insanity defense test was the M’Naughten Test, 
which solely focused on an offender’s cognitive impairment.24 
In the 1970s, the American Law Institute (ALI) established a 
 
21 Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2020).  
22 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).  
23 Major Jeremy A. Ball, Solving the Mystery of Insanity Law: Zealous 
Representation of Mentally Ill Servicemembers, 2005 ARMY LAW. 1, 16 
(2005).  
24 W. Chris Jordan, Conditioned to Kill: Volition, Combat Related PTSD, 
and the Insanity Defense—Providing a Uniform Test for Uniformed 
Trauma, 16 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22, 35-37 (2019).  
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broader test that expanded beyond a mere cognitive test and 
also looked to volitional impartments, known as the Model 
Penal Code (MPC) Test.25 However, Congress largely 
resurrected the M’Naughten Test by passing the Insanity 
Defense Reform Act of 1984, when many jurisdictions began 
rejecting the MPC Test on the basis that it was too lenient.26 The 
gradual expansion—and again narrowing—of the insanity 
defense has led to the development of various insanity defense 
tests among jurisdictions, which can lead to arbitrariness and 
conflict among courts in different jurisdictions. Specifically, 
various jurisdictions follow different insanity defense tests, and 
a jurisdiction’s applicable test will affect the criminal culpability 
of an individual suffering from PTSD.27 Accordingly, PTSD 
does not appropriately fit in the insanity defense in capital 
cases. 
 
A. THE M’NAUGHTEN TEST 
 
According to the M’Naughten Test, to establish an 
insanity defense, it must be clearly proven that, at the time the 
offender committed the act, the offender was “laboring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know 
it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”28 
Particularly, the M’Naughten Test solely focuses on an 
offender’s ability to know his or her actions were wrong, which 
fails to acknowledge the modern understanding of mental 
illness that affects an offender’s ability to know or even be 
aware of the wrongfulness of his or her actions when 
committed.29 In other words, the narrow language of the 
M’Naughten Test “ignores most contemporary knowledge of 
 
25 Id. at 37-39. 
26 Insanity Defense Reform Act, Ch. IV, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
2057 (1984). 
27 Thomas L. Hafemeister & Nicole A. Stockey, Last Stand? The 
Criminal Responsibility of War Veterans Returning from Iraq and 
Afghanistan with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 85 IND. L.J. 87, 112 
(2010).  
28 W. Chris Jordan, supra note 24, at 36.   
29 Id. at 37.  




psychiatry.”30 Thus, the M’Naughten Test fails to recognize 
PTSD as a valid insanity defense because the jurisdictions that 
still use this test apply it in a way that is essentially unchanged 
despite the advancements in the psychiatry field.31  
 
B. THE MPC TEST 
 
Through the MPC Test, the ALI rejected the outdated 
and narrow language of the M’Naughten Test, which solely 
focused on cognitive impairments, and presented a broader 
standard that looked to cognitive and volitional impairments.32 
The MPC Test established a much broader legal concept of 
insanity, which recognized more mental defects as a defense, 
including PTSD.33 The MPC Test states that “[a] person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirement of law.”34 Accordingly, 
in applying the MPC Test, PTSD would likely be grounds for a 
valid insanity defense because the effects of PTSD would cause 
the offender to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her 
conduct to the requirement of law. However, the MPC Test was 
abandoned at the federal level and in many states following the 
passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.  
 
C. INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF 1984 
 
After John W. Hinckley, Jr. was acquitted based on 
insanity for the attempted assassination of President Reagan, 
many people began to reject the MPC Test because they viewed 
 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 38.  
33 Id. at 39.  
34 Id. at 38 (citing Am. Law. Inst., Model Penal Code and 
Commentaries pt. I §§ 3.01-5.07 at 163 (1985)).  
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it as too lenient.35 As a result, Congress passed the Insanity 
Defense Reform Act of 1984, which again substantially 
narrowed the insanity defense in the federal criminal court 
system.36 The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 is now 
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 17, and treats the insanity defense as an 
affirmative defense:  
 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution 
under any Federal statute that, at the time of the 
commission of the acts constituting the offense, 
the defendant, as a result of a severe mental 
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the 
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his 
acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise 
constitute a defense.37 
 
The language used in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 
largely resembles the narrow and outdated language of the 
M’Naughten Test that distinctly rejects an insanity defense on 
the grounds of PTSD.  
The applicable test for insanity is inconsistent 
throughout the United States. In federal courts, the insanity 
defense is governed by the Insanity Defense Reform Act, and 
many states have followed suit and adopted its provisions.38 
The majority of the remaining states continued following the 
MPC standards.39 However, there are notable exceptions 
including states using the Durham Product Test or the 
diminished capacity standard.40 Accordingly, PTSD does not 
appropriately fit within the insanity defense because the array 
of tests used in various jurisdictions to determine an offender’s 
 
35 Id. at 39-40.  
36 Insanity Defense Reform Act, Ch. IV, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
2057 (1984). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2020).  
38 Louis Kachulis, Note, Insane in the Mens Rea: Why Insanity Defense 
Reform is Long Overdue, 26 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOCIAL JUSTICE 245, 250 
(2017).  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  




legal sanity leads to inconsistency and arbitrariness in capital 
cases involving offenders suffering from PTSD.  
 
V. PTSD AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE    
 
As previously stated, the effectiveness of the insanity 
defense in regard to offenders suffering from PTSD facing the 
death penalty, is dependent upon the specific test applied in a 
given jurisdiction. Thus, the insanity defense would only be a 
sufficient place for such an argument in approximately half of 
the jurisdictions throughout the United States. Therefore, 
because the insanity defense does not provide an adequate 
place for PTSD as a defense, it has been argued that PTSD 
should be considered as a mitigating circumstance to be 
weighed against aggravating circumstances at the sentencing 
phase of a capital case.41  
 
A. THE RISE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES  
 
The rise of mitigating circumstances for individualized 
penalty determination began in the 1970s with Furman v. 
Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia. Together, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Furman and Gregg “established that a state capital 
sentencing system must: (1) rationally narrow the class of 
death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a 
reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a 
death-eligible defendant’s record, personal character, and the 
circumstances of his crime.”42  
Additionally, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme 
Court found that a mandatory death penalty scheme is 
unconstitutional, and determined that a sentencer is required to 
look to specific mitigating circumstances to establish an 
 
41 See Debra D. Burke and Mary Anne Nixon, Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and the Death Penalty, 38 HOW. L.J. 183, 183 (1994); Jeffery L. 
Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the 
Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 
631, 676 (2004).   
42 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).  
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individualized penalty determination.43 The Supreme Court 
went even further in Lockett v. Ohio by stating that the sentencer 
may “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, 
any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.”44 
Essentially, these cases emphasized the role of 
mitigating circumstances or factors in the sentencer’s process of 
establishing an individualized penalty determination. 
Specifically, Lockett articulated that the defendant’s character, 
prior record, and the circumstances of the offense must be 
considered by the jury when determining the penalty, and 
weighed against the death penalty.45 However, mental illness 
was excluded from this list. Even though mental illness was 
excluded, some courts have held that an offender’s mental 
health plays a mitigating role.  
 
B. MENTAL ILLNESS AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE  
 
Weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
of a given offender in a capital case is a mere balancing test that 
gives little weight to one specific factor. Accordingly, in 
applying this balancing test, courts have developed 
inconsistent decisions. Specifically, some courts have used 
mental health as a mitigating circumstance to render the death 
penalty disproportionate,46 while other courts have determined 
that mental health does not carry enough weight to find the 
death penalty disproportionate.47     
 
43 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
44 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).  
45 Id.  
46 See State v. Claytor, 574 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 1991).  
47 See State v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648 (Conn. 2004); Davis v. State, 148 So. 
3d 1261 (Fla. 2014).  




1. MENTAL ILLNESS SUCCESSFULLY BARRING THE DEATH 
PENALTY  
 
In State v. Claytor, the death sentence of a paranoid 
schizophrenic was overturned on the basis that his mental 
health as a mitigating factor outweighed the aggravating 
factors.48 A psychiatrist and psychologist testified during the 
penalty phase of the trial that the defendant was mentally ill, 
and “as a result of that illness he lacked the substantial capacity 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”49 
Additionally, the state’s expert witness testified and agreed that 
the defendant was “suffering from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia, which occasionally became acute.”50 The 
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the initial death sentence 
stating that more weight should have been given to the 
mitigating circumstance of the defendant’s mental health.51 
 
2. MENTAL ILLNESS FAILING TO BAR THE DEATH PENALTY  
 
However, other courts have held that mental health 
does not carry a substantial amount of weight as a mitigating 
factor. Specifically, during the penalty phase of the trial of State 
v. Ross, defense counsel claimed, as statutory mitigating factors, 
that at the time of the offense the defendant’s mental capacity 
was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to rise to the 
level of a defense to prosecution.52 Defense counsel further 
presented evidence from a psychiatric expert that the defendant 
suffered from the mental illness that significantly impaired his 
ability to control his actions.53 However, the defendant was 
sentenced to death based on a finding that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the statutory mitigating factor of mental 
 
48 See Claytor, 574 N.E.2d at 482.  
49 Id. at 481.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Ross, 849 A.2d at 695. 
53 Id.  
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illness, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut ultimately 
upheld the defendant’s death sentence.54  
Similarly, in Davis v. State, the defendant claimed that 
his death sentence was disproportionate punishment based on 
the existence of substantial mental illness, which he argued 
made the “aggravating circumstances qualitatively less 
significant and the mitigation weightier.”55 Although the 
Florida Supreme Court took note of the mental health 
mitigation, it ultimately rejected Davis’ argument and upheld 
the death sentence.56   
Even though mental defects have been successfully 
used to mitigate the criminal culpability of a defendant as to 
render the death penalty disproportionate, it is more common 
that an offender’s mental illness is not viewed heavily enough 
to outweigh the aggravating factors in a capital case. Thus, 
PTSD should carry more weight than a mere mitigating factor.  
 
VI. EXCLUSIONARY CATEGORY FOR OFFENDERS WITH PTSD   
 
As the trend towards better understanding PTSD 
continues, offenders with PTSD should be viewed similarly to 
intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles. Particularly, 
offenders with PTSD at the time of committing the offense 
should also be excluded from the death penalty.  
 
A. THE RISE OF EXCLUSIONARY CATEGORIES  
 
The establishment of exclusionary categories exempting 
specific classes of offenders from the death penalty began with 
intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles. However, 
whether intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles 
should be subject to the imposition of the death penalty was a 
topic of controversy from the 1980s until the Supreme Court 
decided in favor of such exclusionary categories in Atkins v. 
Virginia and Roper v. Simmons in the early-to-mid 2000s.57 
 
54 Id. at 759.  
55 Davis, 148 So. 3d at 1280.   
56 Id.  
57 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005). 




1. INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED INDIVIDUALS 
 
In the 1989 case of Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court 
held that it was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment to 
sentence mentally incompetent adults to death.58 At a 
competency hearing before Penry’s murder trial, a clinical 
psychologist testified that Penry was “mentally retarded.”59 
Specifically, it was brought to light that Penry had been 
diagnosed with an organic brain injury, had an IQ of 54, had the 
mental age of a 6 ½-year-old, and the social maturity of a 9-or-
10-year-old.60 This evidence was raised as mitigating factors 
during the penalty phase of trial because the jury did not find 
this evidence strong enough to rise to an insanity defense.61 
Nonetheless, the court held that Penry’s mental disability did 
not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, and sentenced 
him to death.62 Even though the Supreme Court ultimately held 
death sentences of intellectually disabled individuals to be 
constitutional, the Supreme Court overturned Penry’s 
conviction based on the way Texas considered the issue of 
executing defendants with such mental defects.63 After a new 
trial, Penry was again sentenced to death, but in 2001, “the 
Supreme Court threw out Penry’s new death sentence because 
the jury was still not properly instructed about mental 
retardation.”64  
The Court revisited the issue of imposing death 
sentences on intellectually disabled individuals in the 2002 case 
of Atkins v. Virginia. In August of 1996, Atkins shot and killed a 
 
58 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
59 Id. at 307. 
60 Id. at 307-08.  
61 Id. at 309-12.  
62 Id. at 312. 
63 Johnny Paul Penry’s Death Sentence Overturned for Third Time, DEATH 
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/johnny-paul-penrys-death-
sentence-overturned-for-third-time (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).  
64 Id. 
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man after robbing and abducting him.65 During the penalty 
phase of the trial, the defense relied on a forensic psychologist’s 
testimony that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded.”66 The 
psychologist based his conclusion of Atkins’ mental state on 
interviews of Atkins’ friends, family, and acquaintances; review 
of school and court records; and the results of an intelligence 
test that indicated Atkins had an IQ of 59.67 Nonetheless, the 
jury sentenced Atkins to death.68 After appealing, Atkins’ case 
made its way to the Supreme Court, and the Court determined 
that capital punishment of intellectually disabled individuals 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.69  
 
2. JUVENILES  
 
Similarly, in the 1989 case of Stanford v. Kentucky, the 
Supreme Court held that sentencing juvenile murderers—ages 
16 and 17—to death was not a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.70 In Stanford, two cases were consolidated.71 In the 
first case, a 17-year-old boy shot and killed a man, and was 
sentenced to death.72 In the second case, a 16-year-old boy 
stabbed and killed a convenient store owner, and was 
sentenced to death.73 The Supreme Court ultimately upheld 
both death sentences and held that there was “neither a 
historical nor a modern society consensus forbidding the 
imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders 
at 16 or 17 years of age.”74  
 
65Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).  
66 Id. at 308.  
67 Id. at 308-09.  
68 Id. at 309.  
69 Id. at 321. 
70 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 265-67 (1989). 
71 Id. at 364.  
72 Id. at 365-66.  
73 Id. at 366-68.  
74 Id. at 380.  




However, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of 
sentencing a juvenile to death in the 2005 case of Roper v. 
Simmons, when an approximately 17-year-old boy was 
sentenced to death for murder.75 In applying the concept 
established in Atkins, the Supreme Court determined that the 
imposition of the death sentence on anyone under the age of 18 
is disproportionate punishment, thus cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.76  
 
B. TWO-PART TEST ESTABLISHED IN ATKINS AND ROPER  
 
Through Atkins and Roper, the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test for analyzing whether the death 
penalty is an appropriate form of punishment for a certain class 
of offenders under the Eighth Amendment.77 Specifically, there 
must be objective evidence of societal discontent with 
sentencing a certain class of offenders to death and the court 
must subjectively weigh the factors in a given case to determine 
whether the death penalty is proportionate.  
 
1. OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE OF SOCIETAL DISCONTENT   
 
First, in determining whether to impose the death 
penalty, the Court will look to whether the punishment of death 
is proportionate and within the boundaries of the “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”78 In determining if the punishment is proportionate 
and along the lines of human decency, the court examines 
“objective evidence of contemporary values.”79 Accordingly, 
evidence of disfavor and intolerance for the execution of a 
specific class of offenders weighs in favor of a categorical 
exemption from the death penalty.80 As seen in Atkins and 
 
75 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).   
76 Id. at 578. 
77 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 564-79; Roper, 543 U.S. at 311-321. 
78 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
79 Penry, 492 U.S. at 331. 
80 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310. 
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Roper, the national consensus plays a major role in death 
penalty reform. Specifically, the Court generally focuses on 
legislative statistics and practices, and the trend of the national 
consensus.  
In the years following Penry, a national consensus 
against the executions of intellectually disabled individuals 
developed.81 This consensus was evidenced by the fact that 
many states prohibited such executions, many states chose to 
not reinstate the power to conduct such executions, and such 
executions were extremely rare in the states that allowed 
them.82 Thus, the Court compared the national consensus 
during the time of Penry to the national consensus during the 
time of Atkins, determining that when Atkins was presented to 
the Court there was an overwhelmingly larger amount of 
discomfort with and intolerance for the executions of 
intellectually disabled individuals than when Penry was 
presented.83 Accordingly, the Court, following the “evolving 
standards of decency,” created an exclusionary category 
exempting a specific class of offenders—intellectually disabled 
individuals—from the death penalty.84  
Similarly, in the years following Stanford, there was 
evidence of a national consensus against imposing the death 
penalty on juveniles.85 This national consensus was parallel to 
the evidence used in Atkins to establish a national consensus 
among Americans against the imposition of the death penalty 
on intellectually disabled individuals.86 Likewise, this 
consensus provided sufficient evidence that society viewed 
juveniles as categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal.87 Specifically, the consensus was based on the idea 
that a juvenile’s character is not as well-formed as an adult’s, 
and because juveniles have a lack of maturity and an under-
developed sense of responsibility, they are more vulnerable to 
 
81 Id. at 314-16.  
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 310. 
84 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
85 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.   
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 567.  




negative influences.88 Again, by following the “evolving 
standards of decency” the court created another exclusionary 
category exempting juvenile offenders from the death penalty.89  
 
2. SUBJECTIVE FACTORS 
 
The second part of the two-part test in determining the 
proportionality of the death penalty as applied to a specific 
class of offenders is that the Court is to “determine, in the 
exercise of [its] own independent judgment, whether the death 
penalty is disproportionate punishment for [the specified class 
of offenders].”90 Specifically, the Court is able to use its own 
judgment and subjectively consider factors, including 
penological goals of punishment, specific mitigating factors 
that may entitle a class of offenders to a categorical exclusion, 
and whether there is an unacceptable likelihood that a 
sentencer could disregard those mitigating factors to still arrive 
at a death sentence.91  
In Atkins, the Court outlined two rationales as to why 
intellectually disabled individuals should be exempt from 
capital punishment. First, the Court stated that there was a 
serious question as to whether retribution or deterrence applied 
to intellectually disabled individuals.92 Second, the Court 
looked to the reduced mental capacity of intellectually disabled 
individuals as a basis for exempting that specific class of 
offenders from a death sentence.93 The Court based its 
reasoning for creating a categorical exception for intellectually 
disabled individuals on the facts that such individuals have a 
reduced capacity and lesser criminal culpability, thus the 
general justifications for the imposition of the death penalty—
deterrence and retribution—cannot be satisfied where the 
 
88 Id. at 569.   
89 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
90 Roper, 543 U.S. at 546. 
91 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79. 
92 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19. 
93 Id. at 320. 
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defendant is an intellectually disabled individual.94 
Additionally, the Court found there was an unacceptable risk 
that evidence of intellectual disability presented in mitigation 
could too easily be construed by a sentencer as an aggravating 
factor.95  
Similarly, in Roper, the Court questioned the general 
justifications for the death penalty. The Court stated that 
“retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty 
is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is 
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and 
immaturity”96 and that “it is unclear whether the death penalty 
has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on 
juveniles.”97 Additionally, the Court found that there was an 
unacceptable risk that a sentencer may ignore mitigating 
arguments based on age and impose the death penalty.98 
Accordingly, in both Atkins and Roper, the Court used its own 
judgment and subjectively considered specific factors in 
determining the fairness of imposing the death penalty on 
intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles.  
Thus, by looking to the national consensus and 
subjectively weighing relevant factors, the Court found it 
necessary to create exclusionary categories exempting 
intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles from the death 
penalty.   
 
C. TWO-PART TEST APPLIED TO OFFENDERS WITH PTSD   
 
Based on the rationale of the two-part test established in 
Atkins and Roper, there should be a categorical exclusion from 
the death penalty for offenders suffering from PTSD at the time 
of the offense.  
 
1. Objective Evidence Showing Societal Discontent for 
Executing Offenders with PTSD  
 
94 Id. at 304. 
95 Id. at 320-21. 
96 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 573.  





First, by looking to the national consensus, supported 
by legislative efforts and social trends, it seems that there is 
growing discomfort with and intolerance for imposing the 
death penalty on those who suffer from severe mental illness at 
the time of the offense, including PTSD. States have so far been 
reluctant to adopt categorical bans on the death penalty for 
those who have a mental illness.99 Currently, only Connecticut 
has a categorical ban that exempts offenders with mental illness 
from the death penalty.100 However, many states have 
considered death penalty exemption bills for mentally ill 
offenders that have yet to be enacted.101 Specifically, in early 
2020, seven states proposed legislation that would exempt 
offenders with severe mental illness from the death penalty.102 
Additionally, the fact that twenty-one states have abolished the 
death penalty all together is evidence of society’s disfavor for 
it.103 Furthermore, additional states have proposed legislation 
to abolish the death penalty.104 Similarly, the fact that seven 
states have proposed legislation that would exempt offenders 
with mental illness from the death penalty also shows a societal 
trend towards intolerance of the death penalty—at the very 
least intolerance for the current implementation of it. Therefore, 
according to today’s societal standards, imposing the death 
penalty on someone who suffers from PTSD is viewed as 
disproportionate punishment and beyond the boundaries of the 
evolving standards of decency.  
 
 
99 Mental Health, Death Penalty Information Center, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/mental-illness (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2020).  
100 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a (2020).  
101 Mental Health, supra note 99.  
102 Recent Legislative Activity, Death Penalty Information Center, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/recent-legislative-
activity (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).  
103 See Death Penalty Information Center, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2020). 
104 Id.  
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2. SUBJECTIVE FACTORS IN FAVOR OF CREATING AN 
EXCLUSIONARY CATEGORY FOR OFFENDERS WITH 
PTSD 
 
Additionally, based on the second prong of the two-part 
proportionality test, the Court would use its own independent 
judgment in determining whether the death penalty is 
disproportionate punishment for offenders suffering from 
PTSD at the time the offense was committed.105 As previously 
seen in Atkins and Roper, the Court would look to deterrence 
and retribution.106 Accordingly, the Court should create a 
categorical exception for offenders suffering from PTSD at the 
time of committing the offense based on the idea that such a 
mental defect lessens an offender’s criminal culpability. 
Specifically, the general justifications for the imposition of the 
death penalty, which are retribution and deterrence, cannot be 
satisfied where the offender suffers from PTSD at the time of 
the offense. In Atkins and Roper, the Court put a lot of weight on 
the concept that it is disproportionate to put an offender to 
death when that offender has a reduced criminal culpability. In 
Atkins, the Court determined that the criminal culpability of an 
intellectually disabled individual was so reduced that putting 
an intellectually disabled offender to death would be cruel and 
unusual punishment.107 Similarly, in Roper, the Court said that 
it would constitute cruel and unusual punishment to sentence 
a juvenile offender to death because juveniles are 
impressionable, easily influenced, and not yet completely 
developed mentally.108 Accordingly, offenders suffering from 
PTSD at the time of the offense have an equally reduced 
criminal culpability. When PTSD is triggered, the offender acts 
without adequate intent, knowledge, or purpose. Rather, the 
offender acts as if he or she is re-living the traumatic event that 
caused his or her PTSD in the first place.109 Thus, an offender 
with PTSD is—at that moment—like an intellectually disabled 
 
105 Roper, 543 U.S. at 546. 
106 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19; Roper, 543 U.S. at 602.  
107 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.  
108 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
109 Arlin Cuncic, supra note 13.  




individual or juvenile because PTSD reduces the offender’s 
criminal culpability. Therefore, offenders with PTSD should be 
exempt from the death penalty because sentencing such 
offenders to death does not adhere to the general justifications 
of retribution and deterrence.  
Furthermore, the Court can use its own judgment and 
subjectively consider specific mitigating factors that may entitle 
a class of offenders to a categorical exclusion, and consider 
whether there is an unacceptable likelihood that a sentencer 
could disregard those mitigating factors to still arrive at a death 
sentence.110 In considering the parallels between intellectually 
disabled offenders, juvenile offenders, and offenders suffering 
from PTSD at the time of the offense, the Court should, through 
their own subjective judgment, find there to be an unacceptable 
risk that a sentencer may ignore the presence of PTSD, or find 
an unacceptable risk that the evidence of PTSD would be 
viewed as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor.  
Therefore, based on the offender’s reduced criminal 
culpability and likelihood that the sentencer may disregard 
relevant mitigating factors and nonetheless sentence the 
offender to death, the Court should subjectively find the death 
penalty to be disproportionate punishment for offenders 
suffering from PTSD at the time of the offense.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
In light of the evolving meaning of cruel and unusual 
punishment, an offender suffering from PTSD at the time of 
committing the offense should be excluded from the death 
penalty. Specifically, offenders with PTSD at the time of the 
offense should be viewed equivalently to intellectually disabled 
individuals and juveniles, rather than the offender’s PTSD be 
viewed as a piece of the insanity defense or a mere mitigating 
circumstance in capital cases. The Supreme Court has 
established a two-part test for creating an exclusionary category 
exempting a specific class of offenders from the death penalty. 
First, there must be objective evidence of societal discontent 
regarding the execution of the specified class of offenders. 
Second, the Court must use their own independent judgment 
 
110 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79. 
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and consider subjective factors that would lead to the 
conclusion that sentencing the specified offenders to death 
would be disproportionate punishment. By applying this two-
part test to offenders suffering from PTSD at the time of the 
offense, there should be an exclusionary category created for 
this specific class of offenders from the death penalty. The need 
to create such an exclusionary category is supported by the facts 
that there is strong objective evidence of societal discontent for 
executing offenders who were suffering from PTSD at the time 
of the offense and the Court should subjectively find sentencing 
such offenders to death to be disproportionate punishment.  
 
